President Bush’s behind-the-scenes strategy for Iraq is now clear. In the battles for the Sunni town of Fallujah and the Shiite cities south of Baghdad, the Bush administration essentially stood down—hoping to reduce, until the U.S. election is over, images of fighting, mayhem and U.S. blood streaming to the American public.

In Fallujah, the U.S. military withdrew its forces, and the town is being run by anti-U.S. guerrillas and a former general from Saddam Hussein’s regime. Similarly, the United States agreed to pull out most of its forces from towns in the south and allow the rebellious militias of Muqtada al-Sadr to remain armed and at-large.

Although a warrant still exits for al-Sadr’s arrest on murder charges, there is even talk of allowing him to participate in mainstream Iraqi politics. This reality is a far cry from earlier Bush administration boasts to “kill or capture” al-Sadr and “destroy” his militia. In fact, in an implicit admission that a unified and democratic Iraq will never happen, the United States has chosen to avoid the risk of disarming numerous militias all over the country.

Of course, for the long term, this administration strategy does nothing to create a stable and peaceful Iraq. The plan is merely a short-term way to stanch the president’s hemorrhaging in polls at home and maximize his dimming chances for re-election. But then, this invasion was always less about making life better for the Iraqis than doing so for the neoconservatives who hijacked the U.S. government for their own pet overseas social engineering project.

There is a better and more honorable way for the Bush administration to extricate itself from the Iraqi quagmire soon enough for memories to fade before the U.S. November election, while at the same time giving Iraqis the best chance for peace and eventual prosperity: True and immediate self-determination for all factions in Iraq.

Each locality could send a representative to a constitutional convention unattended by any member of the U.S. military or occupation authority. Thus, the convention would be representative of the views of Iraqi society. The delegates would not only negotiate the future governing structure of Iraq but also key issues such as the future distribution of oil revenues.

Iraqis would then ratify by referendum what the convention produced. More than likely, the constitutional convention would produce some type of confederation or loose federation similar to the Swiss canton system—giving substantial autonomy to various groups, tribes or regions—or even three or more independent states.

Many Iraqi factions are likely to retain their armed militias because they fear domination from other groups that might gain control of the central governmental apparatus of a unified post-occupation Iraq.

Recently, Shiite street demonstrations indicate that tensions have increased greatly between the Shia and Sunnis. Similarly, after examining the latest U.N. resolution on a post-June 30 Iraq, the Kurds threatened to walk away from the new interim government after becoming suspicious that their long-standing autonomy could become endangered by the Shiite majority. Such tensions and fears could ultimately cause a civil war.

But the creation of a confederation, loose federation or a partitioned nation should reduce such fears and lessen the chance of internecine conflict. Of course, there’s no guarantee peace has much chance after the Bush administration foolishly opened Pandora’s Box by removing the only thing holding this fractious, artificial country together—Saddam Hussein. But Iraqi self-determination is the best remaining hope.

To those who say that such a “live and let live” agreement among Iraqi factions could not be reached, we need only look at recent developments in the bloody conflict in Sudan. The Islamic Sudanese government and the major Christian rebel group recently reached a framework for peace that would decentralize power in the country to individual states, which would give the rebels effective control of the southern part of the country. Included in the arrangement is a referendum on secession to be held in six years in various parts of the country. The two factions also agreed to share oil revenues.

Although the negotiated settlement of Sudan’s civil war isn’t perfect—it doesn’t include all factions in the country—the episode does show that the possibility of decentralized governance among ethnic or religious groups can give armed combatants enough comfort to negotiate peace. Although the Sunnis oppressed the Kurds and Shia under Saddam’s rule, the bad blood between groups in Iraq is nowhere near the level of that in the bitter and brutal Sudanese conflict (with more than 2 million casualties).

If the welfare of Iraqis was the paramount goal of American leaders, U.S. policy in Iraq would be designed to avoid a similarly nasty civil war. Instead, the Bush administration’s politically driven strategy of retaining a unified Iraqi government, while mollifying armed factions that will eventually try to gain control of it, is a recipe for just such a disaster.