Much media attention has focused on Ukraine’s surprise invasion of the Kursk region in Russia. Russia’s President Vladimir Putin has obviously been unsettled by it. But whether it is a good idea for Ukraine is questionable.

Although Ukraine has been tight-lipped about most information concerning its offensive, analysts have speculated that it was trying to relieve the pressure of a slowly advancing Russian offensive on its own territory by making Russia divert attacking forces to defend its own territory. Another postulated Ukrainian objective is to deliver a psychological jolt to Russia and energize flagging support at home and abroad for the war. Finally, it is argued that taking Russian territory might be used as a bargaining chip to get Russia to give up more Ukrainian territory in any potential peace negotiations.

Only if Ukraine is serious about quickly ending the war and negotiating peace with Russia might this invasion be a good idea. Otherwise, it is a risky offensive undertaken merely for psychological effects. Offensive warfare usually incurs more casualties and burns more weapons and equipment than being on the defense, especially if the defensive side is entrenched, has other battlefield fortifications, or can make the most of rivers, high ground, forests, or other terrain advantages. If nothing else, looking strategically at the entire war, Ukraine going on the offensive when it is already outmanned and outgunned and is facing a simultaneous enemy offensive may make this numerical disadvantage worse.

In this case, given Russia’s substantial advantage in battlefield numbers and weapons, the Ukrainian incursion may not even cause Russia to divert troops from its slowly advancing offensive in Ukraine to fortify the Kursk region. Russia may just try to force the Ukrainians out by throwing more conscripts at them rather than taking forces from their own offensive in Ukraine. In fact, reports are that the Ukrainians are transferring forces to their offensive from already thin defensive lines facing Russian pressure.

Furthermore, trying to hold this pocket in Kursk, which is surrounded on three sides by Russians and connected by an ever-lengthening—and thus more vulnerable—supply line is dangerous and might even be catastrophic. It looks as if, at the time of writing, the Ukrainians are digging in to defend their gains in Russia. But if their seemingly precarious supply line is cut, the Ukrainians could be surrounded.

This invasion of Russia when the Russians are advancing in Ukraine illustrates that militaries in general tend to be enamored with the swagger of bold actions to “take the fight to the enemy.” Yet often there are substantial advantages to being on defense, especially when the defensive force can usually pick the terrain on which it will fight. And despite Ukrainian heroics in general in repelling a superior invader from effacing their country, Ukraine has already experienced one failed offensive in the war.

It is to be hoped that Ukrainian leaders will realize that holding this ground in Russia will be too risky and thus convert the operation into one big hit-and-run raid by withdrawing their forces before they are surrounded and trapped. They have already reaped their psychological gains from the surprise operation on enemy soil, making Russia apprehensive that its long border is insecure.

As for U.S. policy, American policymakers were taken off-guard by the Ukrainian move and were forced to inquire about the objective of the invasion, thus implicitly revealing skepticism of the entire venture. This information gap indicates that—as with other allied countries that the United States supplies with weapons, technology, training, and military know-how—American leaders don’t regularly demand sufficient advanced insight into and influence on allies’ intended military actions, strategy, tactics, and goals. This knowledge deficit seems to intentionally result from American leaders wanting to maintain distance from an ally’s military decisions so they can claim that the United States is not pulling the puppet strings, especially when possible escalation exists with a nuclear-armed great power, such as Russia.

If, however, American leaders do not want to turn military and economic support for Ukraine over to the Europeans, who should have a much greater stake in the game than the United States, they should at least monitor Ukraine’s objectives, intentions, strategy, and tactics more closely to keep the country from hurting its own cause. And U.S. policymakers should start preparing the American public and the Ukrainian government and exhausted populace for the likelihood that any settlement of the war will require Ukraine to give up some of its territory to Russia.

However, such a settlement should not be dishonorable to Ukraine. The Ukrainians have fought gallantly to successfully maintain their country’s existence in the face of an invasion by a much greater military, economic, and political power. Even the Finns, who repelled a similar Russian invasion in the Winter War of 1940, had to give up some territory. Yet today, the world remembers Finland as bravely fending off the behemoth next door, as they will the Ukrainians for their brave defense against an aggressive attempt to erase their country from the map.