Although most political economists in Gordon Tullock’s camp hold favorable views of the common law tradition, Tullock believed its institutions were too vulnerable to error, rent seeking, and corruption. Such criticisms, however, also apply to Tullock’s preferred alternative, civil law.
William F. Shughart II is a Distinguished Research Advisor at the Independent Institute and the J. Fish Smith Professor in Public Choice in the Jon M. Huntsman School of Business at Utah State University.
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Other Independent Review articles by William F. Shughart II
Fall 2024 The DOJ’s Complaint against Apple Doubles Down on Earlier Antitrust Law Enforcement Mistakes
Spring 2023 FDR’s Gambit: The Court Packing Fight and the Rise of Legal Liberalism
Winter 2022/23 The Chevron Doctrine: Its Rise and Fall, and the Future of the Administrative State
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