Community-based Land Adjudication and Registration programs in Afghanistan and the Gacaca courts in postwar Rwanda protected property rights and provided effective dispute resolution when similar formal governmental mechanisms were failing. A model of human action that accounts for moral sentiments helps explain the relative success of these informal and customary governance institutions.
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Colin OReilly is an associate professor of economics at Creighton University and the director of the Menard Family Center for Economic Inquiry.
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